

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 0835

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: WESTERN PLENARY PRESENTATION,
31 JANUARY 1974

FROM US REP MBFR

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF WESTERN STATEMENT TO BE PRESENTED BY
UK REP AT 31 JANUARY PLENARY.

BEGIN TEXT.

COMMON CEILING STATEMENT

1. DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS WE HAVE LISTENED
ROUND THIS TABLE TO A GREAT MANY ARGUMENTS ABOUT
THE RESPECTIVE ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN AND EASTERN
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APPROACHES TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT HAS BECOME

CLEAR THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE ENTERED THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH, AND WITH A DETERMINATION THAT THEY SHOULD SUCCEED. BUT LITTLE PROGRESS HAS SO FAR BEEN MADE IN BRIDGING THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN US. I SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT IT IS TIME TO STAND BACK A LITTLE FROM THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENT AND COUNTER-ARGUMENT, AND TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT WHAT THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE.

2. AS SEEN BY THE GOVERNMENTS WHICH MY COLLEAGUES AND I REPRESENT, THE OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE QUITE SIMPLY SUMMARIZED. IT IS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT INHERENTLY UNSTABLE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE BY CREATING A NEW SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WHICH WILL PROVE DURABLE. WE ASSUME THAT THIS IS ALSO THE BROAD OBJECTIVE OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. IF THIS OBJECTIVE CAN BE ACHIEVED, IT WILL BY ANY STANDARD REPRESENT A MAJOR ADVANCE IN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

3. THIS IS AN AMBITIOUS OBJECTIVE AND IT IS WORTH PAUSING FOR A MOMENT TO CONSIDER ITS IMPLICATIONS. IF THE RELATIONSHIP AT WHICH WE ARRIVE IS TO PROVE ITSELF EFFECTIVE AND LASTING, IT MUST BE SEEN AND ACCEPTED AS INHERENTLY FAIR BY ALL THE PARTICIPANTS TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS; AND GOVERNMENTS WHICH PARTICIPATE IN THE AGREEMENTS ON WHICH IT RESTS MUST BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS FAIRNESS TO THEIR PEOPLES. THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN THESE AGREEMENTS WILL MEAN THAT BOTH SIDES WILL BE BINDING THEMSELVES BY SOLEMN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS TO ACCEPT CERTAIN IMPORTANT LIMITATIONS ON THEIR FORCES, WHEREAS UNTIL NOW THEY HAVE BEEN FREE TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS THEY JUDGE NECESSARY. BUT BEFORE ANY OF US CAN COMMIT OURSELVES TO THIS EXTENT, WE MUST BE SURE THAT WHAT WE ARE COMMITTING OURSELVES TO IS FAIR, AND SEEN TO BE FAIR, TO ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS; AND THAT IT REPRESENTS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FORCES OF EAST AND WEST WHICH WILL ENSURE THE SECURITY

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OF EACH SIDE BUT WHICH WILL GIVE NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO EITHER.

4. SUCH AN OUTCOME WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED BY EQUALIZING REDUCTIONS SIMPLY ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF ARITHMETIC. ONE CAN ARGUE INDEFINITELY ABOUT THE ARITHMETICAL OR STATISTICAL FAIRNESS OF DIFFERENT METHODS OF REDUCTION. BUT THIS IS NOT THE ESSENTIAL

ISSUE. THE ESSENTIAL ISSUE IS TO ARRIVE AT AN EQUITABLE END RESULT WHICH ENSURES STABILITY IN EUROPE AND THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTIES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. I HAVE REFERRED TO OUR OBJECTIVE AS REPRESENTING A MAJOR ADVANCE IN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. I MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT SUCH CONFIDENCE CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED WITHOUT THE CREATION OF A MORE EQUITABLE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAN EXISTS AT PRESENT. THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF ENSURING A SUPERFICIAL EQUALITY IN THE INCIDENCE OF REDUCTIONS. IT IS A MATTER OF ACHIEVING EQUALITY AS REGARDS THE OUTCOME OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. ANY OTHER RESULT WOULD BE BOUND TO CONTAIN THE SEEDS OF FUTURE INSTABILITY. WHEN ONE STARTS FROM AN UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIP ONE CANNOT REACH EQUALITY SIMPLY BY EQUAL REDUCTIONS, WHETHER OF QUANTITY OR PERCENTAGE.

6. IF ONE LOOKS AT THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE CRUCIAL INEQUALITY LIES IN THE IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCES. WHEN I CALL THIS INEQUALITY CRUCIAL, I MEAN THAT IT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, AND ONE WHICH ENTAILS THE BUILT-IN RISK OF ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR WAR IN THE VENT OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN HIS PRESENTATION OF JANUARY 22 THE POLISH REPRESENTATIVE EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE IDEA THAT THE RISK OF ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR CONFLICT ARISES OUT OF THE IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCES. SINCE THE POINT IS A VERY IMPORTANT ONE, LET ME STATE IT AS CLEARLY AS I CAN.

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7. BOTH SIDES ARE DETERMINED TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR. SUCH A WAR WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC FOR EVERYONE. THIS AT LEAST IS COMMON GROUND BETWEEN ALL OF US AROUND THIS TABLE. BUT WE MUST LOOK FURTHER THAN THIS. IT IS EQUALLY OUR JOINT AIM TO AVOID ANY FORM OF ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE PRESENCE OF POWERFUL ARMIES FACING ONE ANOTHER IN CENTRAL EUROPE CARRIES WITH IT THE RISK OF SUCH A CONFLICT, A RISK WHICH IS MOREOVER ENHANCED BY THE EXISTING DISPARITIES. SHOULD THIS OCCUR, THERE IS A FURTHER RISK OF ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR WAR.

8. BUT TO ADDRESS THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR FORCES MAINTAINED BY BOTH SIDES WITHIN THE AREA WOULD NOT

IN ITSELF CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO REDUCING THE RISK
OF NUCLEAR WAR. FOR BOTH SIDES HAVE EVEN MORE POWER-
FUL NUCLEAR FORCES OUTSIDE THE AREA. WE CAN AGREE THAT
IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL OF US WHO ARE PARTICI-
PANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO DO EVERYTHING THAT

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

WE CAN TO ACHIEVE A SITUATION IN WHICH NEITHER SIDE
WILL FEEL THE NEED TO RESORT TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS. THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION WE CAN MAKE
TO THIS WOULD BE TO TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE THE LIKE-
LIHOOD OF ARMED CONFLICT BREAKING OUT, BECAUSE THEREIN
LIES THE RISK OF ESCALATION. THIS MEANS THAT OUR
EFFORTS MUST BE DIRECTED TO ELIMINATING THE POTEN-
TIAL SOURCES OF SUCH A CONFLICT. THIS IS WHY WE
ATTACH OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE TO ELIMINATING THE DIS-
PARITIES BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE. IF THERE IS A STABLE BALANCE IN

GROUND FORCES, AND AT A LOWER LEVEL, THE RISK THAT ARMED CONFLICT MIGHT BREAK OUT OR THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE USED WILL BE REDUCED. THIS IS WHY MY COLLEAGUES AND I ATTACH SUCH VITAL IMPORTANCE TO ELIMINATING THE EXISTING IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCES
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AND WHY WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AGREED COMMON CEILING FOR SUCH FORCES.

9. IT IS ACCORDINGLY IN THIS CRUCIAL AREA - THAT OF THE BALANCE OF GROUND FORCES - THAT WE MUST AIM TO ESTABLISH EQUALITY IF OUR NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO RESULT IN A SOLID AND LASTING SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS IS WHY IT IS A CENTRAL CONCEPT OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE TABLED THAT THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EITHER SIDE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY.

10. IT IS BECAUSE WE RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ADJUSTMENT IN THE EXISTING SITUATION WHICH THIS WILL INVOLVE THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT THIS COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE REACHED IN TWO SEPARATE PHASES OF NEGOTIATION, GOVERNED BY SEPARATE AGREEMENTS. WE DO NOT REGARD IT AS REALISTIC TO AIM TO REACH THIS COMMON CEILING IN ONE SINGLE STEP. BUT WE DO REGARD IT AS ESSENTIAL THAT THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EITHER SIDE, AS WELL AS ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE WHICH WILL BE NEEDED TO MAKE THAT COMMON CEILING A REALITY. AND AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THAT WE WOULD REGARD AS A REALISTIC LEVEL FOR THIS COMMON CEILING, WE HAVE SUGGESTED A FIGURE OF 700,000 MEN ON EITHER SIDE.

11. IT IS OF COUSE A FACT THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON CELING WE HAVE PROPOSED WILL INVOLVE CHANGING THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE USED THIS FACT AS AN ARGUMENT THAT THE WESTERN APPRAOCH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IS SOMEHOW UNFAIR. IN SUPPORT OF THIS CONTENTION, THEY HAVE MAINTAINED THAT THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES HAS BEEN HISTORICALLY DETERMINED AND MUST FOR THAT REASON BE REGARDED AS
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BOTH EQUITABLE AND INVIOABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN HIS STATEMENT ON 20 NOVEMBER SAID OF THE EXISTING FORCE RELATIONSHIP THAT IT HAD "TAKEN SHAPE HISTORICALLY IN THE COURSE OF A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME" AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY IT "ASSURES THE SECURITY OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED;" AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA REFERRED ON 15 NOVEMBER TO THE "HISTORICALLY DETERMINED SITUATION IN EUROPE," AND ASSERTED ON 29 JANUARY THAT THIS SITUATION "ENSURES STABILITY AND SECURITY FOR ALL THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED."

12. EVERYONE AROUND THIS TABLE HAS AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE AND UNNECESSARY IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO ANALYZE THE CAUSES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. EQUALLY HOWEVER MY COLLEAGUES AND I FIND THE ARGUMENT THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION IS IN SOME WAY SANCTIFIED BY HISTORY IS A PUZZLING ONE. ALL EXISTING SITUATIONS ARE THE RESULT OF HISTORICAL EVOLUTION: BUT THE FACT THAT THEY EXIST DOES NOT OF ITSELF MAKE THEM EQUITABLE. WE DO NOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE VIEW THAT WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT. NOR, IN OUR VIEW, HAS THE HISTORY OF POST-WAR EUROPE BEEN SUCH AS TO PRODUCE A SATISFACTORY OR EQUITABLE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. IT HAS BEEN A PERIOD MARKED BY A VARIETY OF RECURRENT, AND SOMETIMES ACUTE, TENSIONS. THE RESULT OF THIS COMPLEX, AND IN MANY WAYS UNHAPPY, HISTORICAL PROCESS IS A MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH ONE SIDE HAS A LARGE PREPONDERANCE OF GROUND FORCES OVER THE OTHER. THIS RELATIONSHIP HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH EQUITY OR EQUALITY, BUT A GREAT DEAL TO DO WITH THE CONFRONTATIONS AND MISTRUST OF THE PAST FROM WHICH WE BELIEVE THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WISH TO MOVE AWAY.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENNA 0835

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

13. MR. CHAIRMAN, IN RECENT YEARS, EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAVE
BEGUN TO SHOW SIGNS OF A WELCOME IMPROVEMENT. INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF ONE KIND OR ANOTHER BEARING DIRECTLY ON THE FUTURE
OF CENTRAL EUROPE HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED, TO WHICH MANY OF THE DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN PARTIES. THE GOVERN-
MENTS WHICH MY COLLEAGUES AND I REPRESENT ARE CONVINCED THAT
THESE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL DETENTE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED
AND STRENGTHENED BY A CORRESPONDING IMPROVEMENT IN THE MILITARY
SITUATION. THIS VIEW, THAT POLITICAL DETENTE SHOULD BE SUPPLE-
MENTED BY MILITARY DETENTE, HAS ALSO BEEN A CONSTANT THEME IN
STATEMENTS BY THE EASTERN SIDE. YET THE EASTERN SIDE CONTINUES
TO MAINTAIN GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS ON A SCALE
WHICH IS OUT OF PROPORTION TO THOSE MAINTAINED BY THE WEST,
AND OUT OF KEEPING WITH THE CHANGE FOR THE BETTER WHICH IS
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TAKING PLACE IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

14. WE BELIEVE THAT A REAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE MILITARY SITU-
ATION MUST INVOLVE BRINGING THE GROUND FORCES OF EAST AND WEST
INTO A MORE EQUAL RELATIONSHIP. TO FREEZE A MILITARY RELATION-
SHIP AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT IN FAVOR OF ONE SIDE MAY BE THE WAY
TO CONSOLIDATE A SHORT-TERM MILITARY ADVANTAGE. BUT IT IS NOT
THE WAY TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENT EQUILIBRIUM. IT WOULD NOT
GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES: ON THE CONTRARY, IT
WOULD PUT ONE SIDE AT A PERMANENT MILITARY DISADVANTAGE. IT

WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO IMPORIVING STABILITY: ON THE CONTRARY, IT WOULD PERPETUATE A BUILT-IN RISK OF INSTABILITY. IT WOULD NOT FULFILL THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH WE AR HERE.

15. FOR ALL THOSE REASONS IT SEEMS TO MY COLLEAGUES AND MYSELF THAT THE APPROACH SO FAR ADVOCATED BY THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS IS NEITHER EQUITABLE NOR COMMENSURATE WITH THE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED US IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO ESTABLISH LASTING SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. NOR WOULDIT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE DESIRE WHICH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE EXPRESSED TO ACCOMPANY POLITICAL DETENTE IN EUROPE WITH MILITARY DETENTE.

16. LET ME SUM UP MY REMARKS IN THIS WAY. THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS THE PRODUCT OF A LONG PERIOD OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION. THAT SITUATION OF CONFORNTATION HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO CHANGE FOR THE BETTER. BUT ALTHOUGH THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS HAVE CHANGES, THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP HAS NOT. IN PARTICULAR, THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT AND DESTIBILIZING IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCES. THIS REFLECTS THE SITUATION OF CONFRONTATION AND MISTRUST FROM WHICH WE ARE ALL SEEKING TO MOVE AWAY. IT SHOULD BE OUR JOINT AIM IN THESE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS TO BRING THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP INTO LINE WITH THE IMPROVED POLITICAL SITUATION AND THUS TO PROMOTE FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING.

17. IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS CANNOT BE DONE BY PERPETUATING THE PRESENT IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCE CAPABILITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. A REAL AND LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY MOVING TOWARDS A RELATIONSHIP OF GREATER EQUALITY. THAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL THAT WE SHOULD AGREE, IN THIS FIRST PHASE OF

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OUR NEGOTIATIONS, ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EITHER SIDE AS THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. END TEXT. HUMES

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